"Restructuring the Financial Structure Personal Views on Financial Reform ; Fundamental Change Little by Little: Banking Evolution," by Anthony M. Solomon & Alex J. Pollock
The  Jerome  Levy  Economics 
Institute  of  Bard  College 
Public  Policy  Brief 
Restructuring 
the  Financial 
Structure 
Personal  Views  on  Financial  Reform 
by  Anthony  M.  Solomon 
Fundamental  Change  Little  by 
Little:  Banking  Evolution 
by  Alex  J.  Pollock 
Introduction 
by  Iiymun  I!  Minsky 
No.l/lSSZ EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY 
Anthony  M.  Solomon,  former  President  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
New  York,  and  Alex  J.  Pollock,  President  of  the  Home  Loan  Bank  of 
Chicago,  inaugurate  a  public  policy  series  of  the  Jerome  Levy  Economics 
Institute.  Their  papers?  presented  at  a  Levy  Institute  conference  on  financial 
restructuring  in  November  I991,  are  ,synthesized  herein. 
,4nthony  Solomon  recommends  institutional  and  regulatory  reform  of  the 
financial  system  by  stating  the  need  to  distinguish  between  the  ideal  system 
and  the  most  practical  system  given  existing  constraints.  Rather  than  haggle 
about  the  parties  responsible  for  the  crisis  in  finance,  it  must  be  acknowl- 
edged  that  the  casualty  was  oversighr  of  the  financial  system  during  the 
1980% 
The  revealed  shortcomings  of  the  1980s  approach  mandate  comprehensive 
reform  of  institutional  powers,  rule-making  structures,  and  supervisory 
arrangements.  The  lesson  of  the  1980s  is  that  “deregulation  of  deposit  insti- 
tutions  (both  commercial  banks  and  thrift  institutions)-while  maintaining 
virtually  unlimited  access  to  the  extensive  safety  net  of  cheap  Federal 
deposit  insurance  without  forceful,  independent,  official  supervision-was  a 
recipe  for  disaster.” 
Even  after  the  recent  rash  of  financial  crises  (e.g.  savings  and  loan  debacle, 
increase  in  bank  failures,  near  insolvency  of  FDIC,  etc.),  there  has  yet  to 
emerge  a  coherent  philosophy  to  establish  basic  principles  on  which  to 
ground  our  future  financial  system.  In  emphasizing  the  importance  of 
avoiding  excessive  concentration  of  economic  and  financial  power, 
Solomon  advocates: 
-  nationwide  banking,  -since  presently  there  arc  too  many  banks,  too 
many  weak  institutions,  and  there  is  too  little  profitability  in  banking” 
-  restrictions  on  Federal  deposit  insurance  (resembling  some  “narrow- 
bank-  proposals) 
-  consolidation  of  financial  regulation 
-  balancing  numerical  standards  with  supervisory  discretion 
-  increased  accountability  of  banks’  management  and  boards,  and  the 
imposition  of  sanctions  as  a  deterrent 
-  “leveling  the  playing  field  across  institutions,  markets,  and  countrics,Y 
necessitating  comprehensive  regulation  across  functional  lines. Although  conventional  wisdom  suggests  that  busts,  crashes,  and  crises  are 
natural  occurrences,  Pollock  notes  the  severity  and  scope  of  simultaneous 
problems  plaguing  finance  in  recent  years.  The  post-war  trends  in  U.S. 
finance  illustrate  a  disturbing  pattern  in  the  ratio  of  capital  to  loans  (e.g. 
loan  leverage),  the  ratio  of  loans  and  assets  to  capital,  and  the  unabated 
acceleration  of  asset  leverage.  He  suggests  that  technology  advancements, 
demographic  changes,  and  other  dynamics  experienced  by  banks,  S&L’s, 
and  insurance  cornpanics  have  not  been  adequately  absorbed  in  the  theoret- 
ical  or  practical  functions  of  these  instlturions. 
Pollock  recommends  ucollareralized  money,”  referred  to  as  “narrow- 
banki+  in  the  past  few  years,  as  the  framework  for  the  optimal  banking 
system.  While  improving  the  nature  of  the  banking  system,  this  proposal 
does  not  require  new  charters,  “breaking  up  of  banks,”  or  other  bureau- 
cratic  measures.  More  importantly,  though,  the  long-term  evolution  of  an 
increasingly  risky  and  more  fragiIc  banking  system  demands  fundamental 
restructuring.  Pollock  declares  that  a  better  fundamental  design  embodies 
the  ensuring  of  stable  liabilities  for  banks  and  the  payments  system  simply 
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Contents The  publication  of  this  Public  Policy  Brief 
could  not  be  more  timely.  The  American  cri- 
sis  in  finance  has  drawn  the  attention  and 
concern  of  academicians,  journalists, 
bankers,  and  policy-makers  since  it  first 
erupted.  The  Jerome  Levy  Economics 
Institute  of  Bard  College,  since  its  inception 
in  1986  as  a  non-partisan,  autonomous,  and 
independently  endowed  research  organiza- 
tion,  has  been  particularly  interested  in  the 
issues  emerging  from  financial  instability, 
their  relation  to  the  functioning  of  the  econ- 
omy,  and  the  necessity  for  reconstituting  the 
financial  structure  for  the  further  develop- 
ment  of  the  complex  and  modern  economy  of 
the  U.S.  The  essays  of  Anthony  Solomon  and 
Alex  Pollock,  contained  in  this  Public  Policy 
Brief,  are  based  on  the  papers  they  delivered 
at  an  Institute  Conference  in  November 
1991. 
The  aim  of  the  Jerome  Levy  Economics 
Institute  is  to  promote  open  debate  on  the 
economic  problems  that  concern  govern- 
ments  and  policy-makers  in  the  United  States, 
in  other  industrialized  nations,  and  in  coun- 
tries  in  the  process  of  development.  The 
launching  of  a  series  of  Public  Poky  Briefs, 
of  which  this  is  the  first  issue,  could  not  have 
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been  a  more  convincing  tribute  to  the  Institute’s  seriousness  of  purpose: 
“To  pursue  knowledge  of  economics  that  will  enable  nations  to  enlarge  per- 
sonal  freedom,  promote  justice,  and  maintain  stable  economies  with  full 
employment  and  rising  standards  of  living.” 
It  would  be  inappropriate  of  me  to  preempt  what  Hyman  Minsky  in  his 
introduction  and  the  authors  of  the  essays  have  to  say  on  the  financial 
structure  of  the  U.S.,  but  perhaps  I  may  be  allowed  to  echo  a  general  theme. 
The  resolution  of  the  financial  instability  and  the  required  reform  do  not 
depend  on  the  application  of  a  simple  formula,  but  on  an  honest  appraisal 
of  the  needs  of  an  advanced  and  innovative  market  economy. 
Dimitri  B.  Papadimitriou 
Exec&ve  Director 
July  1992 
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Itlyman  P.  Minsky 
In  the  193Os,  the  United  States  government 
pledged  that  defined  deposits  at  insured  insti- 
tutions  would  always  be  at  par.  Reserves 
accumulated  by  assessing  depository  institu- 
tions  served  as  the  proximate  funding  for  this 
guarantee:  the  full  faith  and  credit  of  the 
United  States  was  the  ultimate  funding. 
During  1989  and  1990,  widespread 
bankruptcies  and  compromised  equity  posi- 
tions  of  commercial  banks  depleted  the 
reserves  that  insured  deposits.  In  1991,  the 
Congress  had  to  either  replenish  the  insur- 
ance  fund  or  to  renege  on  the  1930s  pledge. 
Events  forced  legislation  to  refinance  deposit 
insurance  onto  Congress’s  agenda  for  1991. 
The  need  to  refund  deposit  insurance  for 
banks  opened  the  door  for  the  Congressional 
agenda  for  I991  to  include  proposals  for 
sweeping  changes  in  the  financial  system. 
Refunding  and  reform  were  to  be  joint  prod- 
ucts.  A  key  document  in  the  discussion  that 
followed,  both  in  and  out  of  Congress,  was 
the  Treasury’s  Modernizing  the  Financial 
System:  Recommendations  for  Safer,  More 
Competitive  Banks  of  February  5,  1991  (the 
so-called  Glauber  report). 
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The  administration  touted  the  Glauber  package  as  the  most  significant  pro- 
posals  for  financial  system  reforms  since  the  Great  Depression.  It  argued 
that  events  had  made  the  financial  system,  whose  structure  was  largely  a 
legacy  of  the  193Os,  an  anachronism:  the  legislated  structure  had  not  been 
adjusted  to  changing  technology,  new  non-bank  financial  institutions,  and, 
implicitly,  the  greater  wisdom  of  economists  and  staffers  at  the  Treasury. 
As  the  1991  session  ended,  Congress  (after  much  huffing  and  puffing)  pro- 
vided  some  $70  billion  to  replenish  the  deposit  insurance  fund.  The  reforms 
were  minimal:  supervision  was  tightened  and  the  authorities  were  granted 
greater  power  to  intervene  as  losses  mounted  in  an  institution  even  though 
equity  had  not  been  fully  dissipated.  No  significant  action  was  taken  to 
change  the  coverage  of  deposit  insurance,  the  regulatory  structure,  the  pow- 
ers  and  authority  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System  and  what  banks  can  do, 
where  they  can  do  it,  and  who  can  own  them.  Meaningful  reform  of  the 
financial  system  feII  by  the  wayside. 
Because  nothing  of  real  significance  was  accomplished  in  1991,  financial 
reform  and  restructuring  are  almost  certain  to  return  to  the  policy  agenda, 
if  not  in  1992  then  after  the  election.  As  a  minimum,  reform  wiIl  enter  the 
agenda  as  the  bank  or  the  savings  and  loan  insurance  funds  need  further 
replenishment,  or  if  Congress  becomes  concerned  about  the  way  the  vast 
portfolio  of  assets  that  have  been  acquired  by  government  agencies  in  the 
process  of  refunding  the  faiIed  institutions  are  administered.  Questions  of 
further  federal  government  funding  and  the  need  for  reform  were  not  put  to 
final  rest  in  1991,  although  Congress,  quite  wisely,  decoupled  the  two. 
Thus,  the  papers  and  the  discussion  at  the  Jerome  Levy  Economics 
Institute’s  conference  on  “Restructuring  the  Financial  Structure,”  which 
was  held  at  Blithewood  in  November  1991,  are  of  continuing  interest  and 
importance.  The  theme  of  the  conference,  that  the  discourse  about  financial 
reform  needs  to  go  beyond  the  narrow  focus  of  the  Treasury’s  and 
Congress’s  1991  agenda,  is  as  true  now  as  it  was  in  1991. 
Meaningful  reform  of  the  financial  system  requires  a  framework  that 
enables  us  to  understand:  1)  why  the  financial  structure  that  was  put  in 
place  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Great  Depression  and  served  the  country  well 
for  almost  fifty  years  stopped  serving  the  country  well;  and  2)  what  princi- 
ples,  i.e.  what  economic  theory,  should  guide  financial  system  reform. 
A  view  about  how  the  economy  works,  i.e.  an  economic  theory,  underlies 
every  interpretation  of  an  economic  situation  and  every  recommendation  to 
IO  Public  Poky  Brief correct  perceived  system  malfunctioning.  Often  the  economic  theory  guid- 
ing  a  diagnosis  and  a  policy  proposal  are  not  well  articulated.  One  aim  of 
the  conference-and  of  the  Levy  Institute’s  project  on  financial  restructur- 
ing-is  to  draw  attention  to  the  need  to  articulate  theoretical  presupposi- 
tions  when  analyzing  the  economy  and  making  policy  proposals. 
In  this  policy  brief,  two  of  the  policy  presentations  at  the  conference  are 
joined.  Both  papers  dealt  with  the  1991  crisis  in  a  longer  perspective: 
Anthony  Solomon’s  from  a  lifetime  of  experience  as  both  a  working 
financier  and  a  public  servant,  and  Alex  Pollock’s  from  a  distinguished 
career  in  private  banking. 
Solomon  begins  with  a  well-articulated  argument  that  from  the  Great 
Depression  to  the  1980s  there  was  a  coherent  regulatory  philosophy  in 
banking  that  recognized  both  the  public  nature  of  the  activity  and  the  way 
the  private  capital  was  supplemented  by  implicit  public  capital.  This  regula- 
tory  philosophy  led  to  a  system  that  worked  well  enough. 
Alex  Pollock’s  experience,  up  to  his  recent  appointment  as  President  of  the 
Chicago  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank,  was  exclusively  as  a  private-sector 
banker,  albeit  one  whose  philosophical  bent  led  to  his  distancing  himself 
from  the  standard  rationalizations  of  their  activities  of  practical  men.  He 
points  out  that  the  growth  of  assets  at  risk  to  measured  capital  or  as  a  per- 
centage  of  total  assets  after  World  War  II  implied  either  that  the  overall 
riskiness  of  the  activity  banking  had  greatly  diminished  or  that  each  bank 
had  an  unstated  “call”  capital  that  underpinned  the  paid  in  capital.  In  this 
interpretation,  the  crisis  of  the  last  several  years  was  not  a  bailout  but  was 
really  a  =call”  on  a  prior  commitment. 
In  the  perspective  of  both  Solomon  and  Pollock,  the  flaw  in  the  deregula- 
tion  of  banking  in  general,  and  the  savings  and  loan  associations  in  particu- 
lar,  was  that  the  interests  of  the  provider  of  the  call  capital  were  not 
attended  to:  bank  regulation  in  this  view  is  the  instrument  by  which  the 
contingent  supplier  of  capital  has  attempted  unsuccessfully  to  contain  its 
exposure. 
Another  aspect  of  the  financial  structure  that  broke  down  in  the  past  sev- 
eral  years  was  that  it  was  a  compartmentalized  system.  Although  Solomon 
envisages  a  consolidation  of  banking  with  the  emergence  of  a  dozen  or  so 
nationwide  branching  systems,  he  also  envisages  the  continuation  of  a 
diversified  system  in  which  many  of  the  banks  are  specialized  to  particular 
parts  of  the  financial  system.  If  provisions  that  ease  de  nova  entry  into  the 
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business  of  banking  are  added  to  a  reform  package,  then  the  recognition  of 
the  profitability  of  specialization-boutiques  are  more  profitable  and  are 
viewed  with  favor  by  the  equity  and  bond  markets-the  Solomon  perspec- 
tive  might  very  well  lead  to  the  emergence  of  a  “horses  for  courses”  bank- 
ing  structure. 
Pollock’s  discussion  of  collateralized  banking  cuts  through  the  “narrow- 
banking”  debate  by  identifying  the  problem  of  generating  a  stable  banking 
system  as  limiting  the  assets  that  would  offset  the  insured  monetary  liabili- 
ties  of  institutions.  An  implication  of  Pollock’s  insight  is  that  any  bank  will 
be  free  to  offer  any  type  of  uninsured  liability  for  the  financing  of  particular 
ranges  of  asset  holdings.  The  complement  to  the  collateralized  money  bank 
whose  liabilities  are  called  deposits  and  are  secure  is  a  credit  bank  whose 
at-risk  liabilities  would  finance  asset  holdings  as  defined  in  the  equivalent 
of  a  prospectus.  The  possibility  of  a  geographically  distributed  system  of 
independent,  finance-oriented  institutions  that  offer  a  menu  of  liabilities 
with  differing  portfolios  to  a  community  of  asset  holders  is  an  intriguing 
aspect  of  the  Pollock  proposal.  One  could  argue  that  the  objective  of  the 
Pollock  proposal  is  to  simultaneously  provide  for  a  safe  and  secure  medium 
of  exchange  and  for  institutions  that  promote  the  capital  development  of 
the  economy,  without  simultaneously  promoting  those  speculative  aspects 
of  financing  that  make  the  Casino  designation  of  the  financial  structure  of 
the  1980s  apt. 
It  is  clear  that  more  is  at  issue  in  banking  and  financial  reform  than  the 
bailout  of  overextended  institutions.  In  its  activities  in  finance  the  Jerome 
Levy  Economics  Institute  is  performing  what  can  only  be  a  useful  function: 
it  is  broadening  the  discourse. 
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The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  discuss  how 
to  reform  and  modernize  the  U.S.  financial 
system  so  as  to  put  our  institutions  on  a 
healthier  footing,  and  assure  that  they  are  in 
position  to  finance  adequate  economic 
growth  in  the  country  in  the  years  ahead. 
This  is  a  subject  of  great  significance  for  our 
nation’s  future.  In  1991,  we  witnessed  a  con- 
tentious,  often  confusing,  and  ultimately 
inconclusive  debate  over  institutional  and 
regulatory  reform  both  between  the  Bush 
administration  and  the  Congress  and  within 
the  Congress  itself.  There  are  many  complex 
issues  involved,  many  dilemmas  that  must  be 
sorted  out,  and  many  options  for  changing 
the  system  we  now  have.  I  think  it  is  possible 
to  cut  through  the  complexity  and  make 
some  sense  of  what  the  guiding  principles  for 
an  improved  financial  system  ought  to  be. 
To  begin  at  the  most  general  level,  there  are 
two  distinct  dimensions  to  the  question  of 
financial  reform.  The  first  is  to  try  to  define 
an  ideal  system.  This  requires  paying  close 
attention  to  what  went  wrong  in  the  198Os, 
when  so  many  banks  and  thrift  institutions 
failed  or  came  close  to  failing.  Many  are  still 
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in  the  intensive  care  ward.  It  requires  paying  close  attention  to  what  differ- 
ent  types  of  financial  institutions  (e.g.  commercial  banks,  savings  and  loans, 
securities  firms,  investment  banks,  finance  companies  like  GE  Credit,  insur- 
ance  companies,  mutual  funds,  etc.)  are  actually  doing,  how  they  compete 
among  themselves,  and  with  what  special  advantages  or  handicaps. 
It  also  requires  paying  close  attention  to  what  is  going  on  outside  the 
United  States  and  the  other  major  industrial  countries.  Their  institutions  are 
becoming  bigger  and  increasingly  competitive,  but  their  institutional  struc- 
tures  and  rules  of  the  game  are  very  different  from  our  own.  Coming  to  a 
view  of  what  would  count  as  an  ideal  system  should  not  be  colored  by 
bureaucratic  or  political  considerations,  no  matter  how  influential  they  may 
be  in  the  real  world. 
The  second  dimension  is  to  define  the  range  of  what  is  feasible  in  that  real 
world  and  to  try  to  identify  the  best  practical  course  of  action.  Realism 
means  understanding  the  powerful  and  deeply  ingrained  interests  at  stake 
and  the  personalities  involved.  In  fact,  the  players  in  the  politics  of  financial 
reform  are  a  unique  fraternity.  This  is  not  a  constituency  issue,  unlike 
highly  charged  topics  such  as  taxes,  abortion,  and  gun  control.  The  general 
public  only  knows  broadly  what  it  wants:  bank  deposits  that  are  unques- 
tionably  safe,  access  to  credit  (preferably  on  generous  terms),  and  not  too 
much  concentration  of  economic  power.  Beyond  those  simple  preferences, 
the  ordinary  voter  has  no  particular  view  on  the  subjects  of  how  to  struc- 
ture  and  how  to  regulate  fmancial  institutions  and  markets.  Senators  and 
Representatives  are  not  going  to  be  voted  in  and  out  of  office  in  any  elec- 
tion  on  the  basis  of  whether  they  were  in  favor  of  or  against  the  repeal  of 
Glass-Steagall  or  McFadden-Douglas,  although  they’might  be  for  being 
associated  with  some  of  the  rogues  that  popped  up  in  the  last  decade. 
To  most  people,  the  task  to  financial  reform  is  rightly  seen  as  highly  techni- 
cal  and  complex:  it  is  better  left  to  the  experts.  I  have  been  around,  and 
possibly  among,  such  experts  on  and  off  for  some  two  decades:  in  govem- 
ment  as  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  for  Monetary  Affairs  during  the 
Carter  administration,  in  central  banking  as  President  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  Bank  of  New  York,  and  in  private  business  as  an  investment 
banker  and  as  a  director  of  mutual  and  pension  funds.  I  have  learned  that 
the  experts  differ  widely  on  what  should  be  done  to  reform  the  system,  even 
when  they  agree  that  reform  is  needed  and  even  when  they  share  similar 
ideological  principles.  Thus,  after  hearing  the  experts  dissent,  the  politicians 
(who  must  ultimately  pass  something  into  law)  allow  themselves  to  be 
swayed  by  those  who  have  the  strongest  feelings  on  the  subject-namely, 
Public  Poky  Brief - 
Personal  Views  on  Financial  Reform 
the  commercial  bankers,  investment  bankers,  insurance  salesmen,  and  other 
fmancial  executives  who  have  a  lot  riding  on  how  financial  reform  takes 
shape  and  whose  turf  will  either  be  protected  or  left  exposed  to  the  perils  of 
new  competition.  This  is  the  elemental  politics  of  the  professional  lobbyist, 
the  political  action  committee,  and  the  campaign  contribution. 
Those  who  watched  the  recent  comings  and  goings  in  Washington  over  the 
issue  of  financial  reform  witnessed  a  predictable  outcome  of  this  clash  of 
powerful  forces-gridlock.  Both  the  administration’s  comprehensive  reform 
proposal  and  the  alternative,  sharply  different  legislative  package  that  came 
out  of  two  warring  committees  of  the  two  houses  fell  by  the  wayside.  The 
outcome  in  1991  was  a  most  strained  down  version  of  reform. 
At  this  stage  of  my  career,  I  have  the  luxury  of  stepping  back  from  this 
political  process  and  saying  what  I  think  about  the  first,  and  ultimately 
most  important,  dimension:  what  should  be  done  to  improve  our  financial 
system. 
By  way  of  background,  it  may  be  worthwhile  to  review  very  briefly  our 
financial  institutions  and  how  they  got  into  the  mess  they  are  in  now.  The 
shortcomings  in  the  1980s  necessitate  comprehensive  reform  of  institutional 
powers,  rule-making  structures,  and  ongoing  supervisory  arrangements. 
The  key  lesson  of  the  1980s  is  that  deregulation  of  deposit  institutions, 
both  commercial  banks  and  thrift  institutions,  while  maintaining  virtually 
unlimited  access  to  the  extensive  safety  net  of  cheap  federal  deposit  insur- 
ance  and  without  forceful  independent  official  supervision,  was  a  recipe  for 
disaster.  Let  us  recognize  that  the  marketplace  is  extraordinarily  adaptive: 
old  regulatory  assumptions  are  swiftly  invalidated  as  business  shifts  from 
the  most  to  the  least  regulated  channel. 
In  the  198Os,  banks  lost  their  best,  most  credit-worthy  customers  to  the 
open  securities  markets,  where  highly  credited  corporations  could  borrow 
more  cheaply  than  banks  themselves.  Regulators  did  not  truly  appreciate 
the  potential  of  money  market  funds,  and  so  allowed  them  to  grow  without 
seeking  legislative  authority  to  impose  any  of  the  requirements  that  restrict 
banks.  Money  funds  have  never  faced  either  non-interest-bearing  reserve 
requirements  or  regulatory  capital  ratios. 
At  the  same  time,  the  business  of  lending  money  to  families  to  buy  homes 
was  also  changing  dramatically.  Securitization  of  mortgages,  aided  impor- 
tantly  by  government-sponsored  enterprises  such  as  Ginny  Mae,  Fannie 
Mae,  and  Freddie  Mack,  meant  that  large  institutions  such  as  insurance 
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companies  and  pension  funds  could  indirectly  compete  with  the  traditional 
holders  of  mortgages,  the  thrifts.  For  a  while,  securitized  instruments  were 
safe,  attractive  assets  for  these  institutions.  Such  competition  inevitably  cut 
the  rate  of  return  that  the  typical  savings  and  loan  institution  could  expect 
to  make  from  its  core  business. 
Commercial  banks,  which  were  losing  top  corporate  borrowers  to  the  open 
credit  market,  and  thrift  institutions,  which  were  losing  mortgage  business 
.  to  the  giant  institutional  investors,  took  advantage  of  deregulation  to  move 
into  other  lending  areas.  Thrift  institutions  lent  billions  to  commercial  real 
estate  developers,  established  real  estate  development  companies,  financed 
undeveloped  land,  and  bought  junk  bonds.  In  short,  they  moved  headlong 
away  from  relatively  safe  but  relatively  low-yielding  assets  into  all  sorts  of 
risky  assets.  They  financed  all  of  this  on  the  basis  of  deposits  that  were  fully 
insured  by  the  federal  government.  if  they  could  not  raise  the  needed  funds 
locally,  they  merely  turned  to  Wall  Street  and  paid  what  was  necessary  to 
acquire  broker  deposits.  There  was  virtually  nothing  in  the  regulatory  sys- 
tem  of  the  mid-1980s  to  slow  down  this  out-of-control  credit  machine. 
At  the  time,  no  one  knew  just  how  risky  those  new  kinds  of  loans  would 
be-nor,  in  the  case  of  the  savings  and  loan,  just  how  many  crooked  opera- 
tors  were  entering  the  business  (we  now  know).  Meanwhile,  the  taxpayer  is 
poorer  by  anywhere  from  $200  to  $400  billion,  depending  on  how  bad  the 
commercial  real  estate  situation  gets  before  it  stabilizes. 
In  the  198Os,  the  regulatory  system  lost  its  traditional  moorings.  Back  in 
quieter  times,  like  the  19.50s,  there  was  a  coherent  financial  regulatory  phi- 
losophy  in  the  United  States  that  regulation  should  carve  out  and  preserve 
franchises  for  financial  institutions.  Financial  institutions,  strictly  segre- 
gated  by  type,  would  always  be  profitable  enough  to  build  up  capital 
reserves.  They,  therefore,  would  be  in  a  position  to  ride  out  the  ups  and 
downs  of  the  business  cycle  without  direct  government  aid.  That  somewhat 
paternalistic  but  basically  sensible  view  was  eroded  over  time. 
By  the  time  Ronald  Reagan  arrived  on  the  scene,  this  view  was  largely  dis- 
credited:  it  was  sneered  at  by  academic  economists  and  questioned  by 
politicians  of  both  parties.  Democrats  who  protected  franchises  were 
ridiculed  as  hypocritical  by  free  market  advocates,  while  Republicans  were 
all  too  ready  to  embrace  the  winning  Reagan  ideology.  The  casualty  was 
oversight  of  the  financial  system. 
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Even  now  (long  after  the  savings  and  loan  debacle,  the  striking  increase  in 
bank  failures,  and  the  near  insolvency  of  the  FDIC),  no  coherent  philoso- 
phy  has  emerged  to  establish  basic  principles  on  which  to  ground  our 
future  financial  system.  Do  we  prefer  the  law  of  the  jungle,  letting  the  chips 
fall  where  they  may  for  both  the  biggest  and  the  smallest?  It  is  still  the  pol- 
icy  of  the  U.S.  to  protect  all  depositors  in  banks  that  are  deemed  too  big  to 
fail.  Are  we,  therefore,  condemned  to  cynical  pragmatism-disregarding 
profitability  and  imprudent  balance  sheets-until  losses  materialize,  and 
then  seIectively  bailing  out  institutions  depending  on  their  impact  on  the 
. rest  of  the  financial  system  or  the  political  clout  of  their  representatives? 
The  U.S.  Treasury  study  on  modernization  came  down  strongly  against  that 
kind  of  cynicism.  However,  it  backed  away  from  the  implications  of  its 
own  analysis,  namely  that  some  very  large  banks  would  have  to  fail  if  mar- 
ket  discipline  were  to  be  taken  to  its  logical  conclusion.  The  Treasury  pol- 
icy-makers  temporized  and  their  position  remains  an  uncomfortable  mix  of 
partial  market  discipline  and  implicit  government  protection. 
This  brings  me  to  a  statement  of  those  principles  of  financial  reform  that  I 
feel  are  important,  regardless  of  whether  they  are  politically  feasible  at  the 
present  time.  First,  nationwide  banking  should  be  allowed.  We  should,  of 
course,  always  seek  to  avoid  excessive  concentration  of  economic  and 
financial  power.  As  a  practicable  matter,  by  any  reasonable  yardstick,  our 
financial  system  is  not  highly  concentrated.  To  the  contrary,  ,we  have  too 
many  banks,  too  many  weak  institutions,  and  too  little  profitability  in 
banking.  This  increases  the  cost  in  both  equity  and  debt  capital  to  deposit 
institutions,  making  them  less  competitive,  less  capable  of  gr.owing,  and 
therefore  less  able  to  support  economic  growth.  The  simplest  step  for  treat- 
ing  this  shortcoming  is  to  permit  full  nationwide  banking.  I  believe  there  is 
growing  agreement  that  this  would  be  a  positive  development.  After  all,  as 
a  result  of  various  regional  compacts  and  bilateral  state  reciprocity 
arrangements,  we  are  already  about  three-quarters  there. 
While  the  consolidation  of  financial  institutions  itself  does  not  pose  much 
of  a  threat,  there  is  reason  to  be  wary  of  allowing  commercial  and  indus- 
trial  corporations  to  own  and  control  large  commercial  banks.  That  is  a 
combination  not  found  in  other  major  industrial  countries,  and  it  is  not 
necessary  for  attracting  equity  capital  to  the  banking  industry.  It  could  lead 
to  undue  economic  power.  Besides,  in  those  instances  where  commercial 
and  industrial  firms  have  owned  and  controlled  thrift  institutions,  which  is 
permitted,  their  management  capabilities  have  been  found  wanting. 
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Second,  federal  deposit  insurance  should  be  restricted.  The  availability  of 
deposit  insurance  has  gotten  out  of  hand.  I  agree  with  the  U.S.  Treasury 
that  we  should  limit  the  number  of  fully  insured  accounts  that  an  individual 
can  hold,  and  we  should  strictly  limit  access  to  insured  brokered  deposits.  I 
acknowledge  that  these  limits  would  impose  somewhat  more  of  a  burden 
on  smaller  banks  than  on  larger  banks,  but  without  such  limits  the  taxpayer 
will  remain  excessively  exposed  to  repeated  large  loses. 
Alternative  proposals  have  been  made  for  constricting  the  scope  of  deposit 
insurance  either  by  tightening  the  eligibility  standards  of  deposit  institutions 
to  enforce  potential  lending  standards  or,  even  more  radically,  by  adopting 
what  is  called  the  narrow-bank  concept.  The  narrow-bank  approach  would 
require  banks  to  invest  insured  deposits  entirely  in  assets  of  the  highest 
credit  quality,  such  as  government  securities.  I  am  skeptical  that  either  of 
these  more  extreme  options  would  necessarily  lead  to  a  safer  banking  sys- 
tem.  You  might  simply  rearrange  the  location  of  potential  problems.  But 
doing  nothing  about  the  exposure  of  the  deposit  insurance  system,  which  is 
the  expressed  position  of  the  Congress,  is  not  right  either.  In  my  opinion, 
incremental  measures  to  limit  the  number  of  insured  accounts  is  a  reason- 
able  compromise. 
Third,  financial  regulation  should  be  consolidated.  If  the  government  essen- 
tially  underwrites  a  great  bulk  of  the  financial  liabilities  of  banks,  whether 
through  the  federal  deposit  insurance  system  or  through  the  implicit  safety 
net  inherent  in  a  doctrine  of  “too  big  to  fail,”  then  the  government  has  to 
have  the  right  to  closely  supervise  the  operations  of  institutions  holding 
insured  deposits.  To  do  that  effectively,  it  must  put  in  place  a  sounder  regu- 
latory  structure  and  sufficient  talent  to  perform  a  difficult  job  with  exper- 
tise  and  judgment. 
Today  the  regulatory  structure  is  not  working  properly  as  there  are  too 
many  regulatory  bodies  at  the  federal  level.  The  existence  of  fifty  state 
banking  commissions  and  fifty  state  securities  commissions  is  an  anachro- 
nism.  Altogether,  the  regulatory  system  produces  massive  duplication  and 
overlapping  authority,  which  coexist  with  huge  blind  spots  and  regulatory 
gaps.  It  fails  to  deliver  real  accountability,  and  it  fails  to  provide  a  mandate 
for  early  action  for  solving  emerging  problems  before  they  become  life- 
threatening  for  a  bank  and  highly  costly  to  the  taxpayer.  It  lags  behind 
market  innovations  and  is  inconsistent  with  the  developing  trend  in  which 
the  homogenizing  commercial  and  investing  banking  firms  compete  in  so 
many  lines  of  business,  such  as  foreign  exchange  dealings  and  interest  rate 
and  currency  swaps.  It  lacks  the  capacity  for  negotiating  internationally - -- 
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sound  agreements  for  harmonizing  regulatory  standards  and  practices.  In 
short,  an  improved  regulatory  system  must  be  more  alert,  more  responsive, 
and  less  handicapped  by  the  problem  of  financial  practitioners  engaging  in 
sharp  practices  (e.g.  cutting  corners  to  stay  ahead  of  the  regulators).  This 
requires  better,  more  streetwise  regulatory  personnel  for  whom  adequate 
compensation  is  essential. 
I  would  like  to  see  regulatory  consolidation  and  clarity  unifying  the  federal 
financial  supervising  agencies,  with  the  Federal  Reserve  playing  a  leading 
role.  That  is  because  when  all  is  said  and  done,  it  is  only  the  central  bank, 
both  in  our  country  and  other  industrial  countries,  that  has  the  ability  and 
resources  to  act  as  a  lender  of  last  resort,  whether  to  individual  institutions 
facing  liquidity  problems  or  to  the  system  as  a  whole. 
Fourth,  reliance  on  numerical  standards  such  as  capital  ratios  should  not 
eliminate  supervisory  discretion  in  evaluating  banks.  I  would  seek  to  strike 
a  sensible  balance  between  formal  and  often  numerically  precise  require- 
ments,  such  as  the  recent  emphasis  on  minimum  capital  ratios,  and  more 
informal  supervisory  guidelines  that  stress  the  individual  character  of  differ- 
ent  banks  or  types  of  banks.  Thus,  I  would  put  a  great  deal  of  emphasis  on 
adequate  diversification,  which  is  more  a  matter  of  judgment  than  of  for- 
mulas.  Two  banks  with  the  same  capital  ratios  can  have  wildly  different 
exposure  to  risk  as  well  as  staunchly  different  long-term  profitability, 
depending  on  the  overall  structure  of  their  loan  portfolios  and  their  off-bal- 
ance  sheet  positions. 
This  does  not  mean  that  I  would  water  down  tough  capital  ratios.  I  am  fre- 
quently  struck  by  the  fact  that  some  of  the  most  profitable  banks,  as  mea- 
sured  by  the  rate  of  return  on  equity,  are  those  with  relatively  high  capital 
ratios  and  conservative  balance  sheets.  But  that,  I  think,  is  simply  because 
they  are  better  bankers  in  the  sense  of  having  greater  skills  in  measuring 
and  monitoring  risk  and  distinguishing  between  borrowers  who  are  likely 
to  repay  and  those  who  are  not:  this  cannot  be  mandated  by  regulation 
alone.  Nevertheless,  I  am  fairly  confident  that  an  improved  system  for 
supervising  banks  would  have  transparent  accounting  standards  rather  than 
the  largely  opaque  accounting  standards  now  permitted;  there  would  be  less 
ability  for  banks  to  disguise  problems  and  not  recognize  impaired  assets. 
Whether  an  ideal  system  would  go  all  the  way  to  extreme  proposals,  such 
as  mark-to-mark  market  accounting,  or  even  to  more  stringent  lower  cost 
or  market  accounting,  is  questionable.  It  would  impart  greater  volatility  on 
earnings  and,  at  least  for  a  period  of  time,  translate  that  volatility  into  stock 
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prices.  Whether  an  ideal  system  should  follow  the  European  practice  of  per- 
mitting  hidden  reserves  is  even  more  dubious. 
I  do  feel  strongly  that  an  improved  regulatory  system  could  be  far  better 
supported  than  it  is  now  by  the  outside  auditors  of  banks:  there  have  been 
too  many  cases  in  which  outside  auditors  have  shown  themselves  to  be 
quite  ineffective  in  detecting  frauds  or  shady  practices  and  all  too  ready  to 
bend  over-backwards  to  make  a  bank’s  condition  appear  more  favorable 
than  it  really  is.  Some  of  the  more  egregious  cases  have  ended  up  with  large 
lawsuits,  which  I  suppose  is  inevitable  in  our  culture.  The  one  practical 
improvement  I  would  recommend  would  be  to  establish  a  set  of  fines  that 
could  be  imposed  by  the  Federal  Reserve  on  the  auditing  firms  of  banks 
that  require  discount  window  support,  where  the  true  condition  of  the 
bank  was  obscured  and  the  outside  auditor  did  nothing  to  force  manage- 
ment  to  provide  full  disclosure. 
Fifth,  management  and  boards  of  banks  should  be  held  accountable,  and 
sanctions  should  be  imposed.  A  higher  duty  of  care  must  be  enforced  for 
the  boards  of  directors  and  management  of  financial  institutions.  The  basic 
principle  is  that  banking  is  not  purely  an  entrepreneurial  activity.  It  involves 
extensive  fiduciary  duties  and  public  responsibilities  to  the  financial  system 
at  large. 
I  support  the  idea  that  the  regulatory  agency  should  have  the  clear  mandate 
to  intervene  at  an  early  stage  when  a  bank  begins  to  go  wrong,  and  not 
have  to  wait  until  the  bank  has  become  obviously  insolvent  before  stepping 
in.  Accordingly,  I  support  the  notion  that  regulators  should  have  the  clear 
Iegal  authority  to  make  an  ailing  bank  suspend  its  dividends.  The  short- 
term  adverse  impact  of  regulatory  actions  -which  include  dividend  suspen- 
sion  on  stock  market  evaluations  on  the  bank  concerned,  or  on  large  depos- 
itors  who  may  try  to  transfer  funds  into  an  alien  institution-should  be 
subordinated  to  a  hard-nosed  evaluation  for  the  long-term  health  of  the 
bank.  Naturally,  part  of  the  effort  to  intervene  early  should  include  stiff 
restrictions  on  the  compensation  and  bonuses  of  management.  Even  so,  I 
remain  somewhat  skeptical  that  bank  regulators  can  entirely  keep  up  with 
sharp  practices  or  new  business  activities  that  can  put  in  jeopardy  a 
marginal  institution. 
Sixth,  we  need  to  level  the  playing  field  of  institutions,  markets,  and  coun- 
tries.  There  are  several  serious  weak  spots  or  inequities  in  the  system.  The 
first  is  the  absence  of  comprehensive  regulation  across  functional  lines.  We 
are  in  an  age  in  which  financial  functions  are  not  neatly  divided  by  type  of financial  institution,  but  the  jurisdictions  of  our  financial  regulatory  author- 
ities  continue  to  be  established  according  to  traditional  institutional  type. 
To  their  proponents,  the  narrow  focus  of  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission,  which  oversees  securities  fiims  and  investment  companies, 
and  the  Commodities  Future  Trading  Commission,  whichoversees  com- 
modity  brokers,  is  justified  on  the  grounds  that  it  permits  these  agencies  to 
build  a  high  level  of  technical  expertise.  But  there  are  serious  drawbacks  in 
our  world  in  which  banking,  trading  securities,  underwriting,  futures  activi- 
ties,  and  risk  management  are  increasingly  interwoven.  Harmonizing  these 
various  functions  under  a  centralized  financial  regulatory  authority  would 
permit  technical  expertise  to  be  preserved,  but  it  would  make  sure  that 
banks,  securities  firms,  and  other  financial  institutions  are  treated  alike  and 
supervised  comprehensively. 
Such  an  amalgamation  would  also  allow  us  to  resolve  other  weaknesses 
that  contribute  to  an  uneven  playing  field  at  times.  For  instance,  life  insur- 
ance  companies  have  no  federal  regulator,  and  the  different  practices  and 
competencies  of  state  insurance  commissions  lead  to  anomalies  and  poten- 
tial  risks.  Several  insurance  companies  have  become  deeply  involved  in 
investment  banking,  in  futures  and  options  trading,  and  other  fmancial  ser- 
vices  normally  associated  with  banking.  Moreover,  money-market  funds  get 
unjustifiably  special  treatment.  Finally,  our  equity  markets  are  overly  regu- 
lated  relevant  to  our  futures  markets. 
As  Treasury  Secretary  Brady  has  long  maintained,  without  much  support  in 
Congress,  the  need  for  harmonization  is  compelling.  Federal  regulatory  har- 
monization  in  the  U.S.  is  probably  a  precondition  for  any  serious  negotia- 
tion  to  create  a  more  level  playing  field  for  financial  services  internation- 
ally.  To  be  sure,  progress  has  been  made  in  this  area  since  the  early  and 
highly  tender  step  of  a  decade  or  so.  The  Base1 Accord  on  capital  ratios  was 
a  significant  accomplishment.  It  has  done  a  lot  to  quiet  the  criticism  that 
American  banks  had  to  live  under  a  much  tougher  regime  than  others,  espe- 
cially  the  Japanese.  it  has  also  encouraged  collaboration  in  other  areas  such 
as  payment  system  risks.  But  until  we  have  basic  reform  of  financial  powers 
and  our  regulatory  structures  in  the  U.S.,  and  so  long  as  the  European 
Community  is  committed  to  financial  and  ultimately  monetary  unification 
of  some  sort,  we  are  bound  to  run  into  potentially  serious  disagreements 
with  the  Community.  Reciprocity  may  start  to  be  used  against  our  institu- 
tions  in  Europe,  unless  we  at  least  get  rid  of  restrictions  on  nationwide 
banking.  As  the  U.S.  Treasury  has  learned,  other  countries  are  not  about  to 
accept  our  distinctive  legal  forms,  such  as  the  holding-company  structures 
for  banks  and  other  financial  institutions 
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These  six  principles  detail  my  perspective  as  to  what  a  foundation  of 
stronger  financial  system  in  the  U.S.  should  be.  I  recognize  that  not  all  will 
be  supported  or  adobted.  Let  me  conclude  by  giving  some  idea  of  how  I  feel 
the  future  will  evolve.  I  would  classify  myself  as  a  cautious  optimist.  We 
will  not  get  comprehensive  financial  reform,  but  we  will  probably  get  piece- 
meal  improvement:  certainly  there  will  be  setbacks.  The  1991  vote  in  the 
Senate  to  impose  caps  on  the  interest  rates  banks  may  charge  on  credit  card 
lines  is  a  timely  warning  that  mischief  is  always  lurkmg. 
United  States  fmancial  institutions  are  going  to  improve  their  balance  sheets 
and  profitability  over  the  rest  of  the  decade.  The  fears  of  a  systematic  col- 
lapse,  which  pervaded  the  market  during  1990  and  1991,  have  proved  to 
be  unfounded.  Tbe  Federal  Reserve  would  never  stand  aside  and  allow  a 
major  proportion  of  the  banking  system  to  fail  as  a  result  of  a  nationwide 
business  recession.  Instead,  it  would  ease  monetary  policy,  as  in  fact  it  has 
done  and  continues  to  do.  The  combination  of  a  steeply  positive  slope  yield 
curve,  which  allows  banks  to  improve  their  earnings  without  taking  on  any 
additional  credit  risk,  and  the  beginning  of  an  economic  recovery  will  con- 
tribute  to  better  bank  profits.  As  a  result,  the  share  prices  of  bank  stocks 
rallied  in  1991. 
The  1990s  will,  however,  be  a  period  of  unprecedented  consolidation  and 
restructuring  of  financial  institutions.  Out  of  this  process  will  emerge  a  sub- 
stantial  number,  perhaps  ten  or  fifteen,  of  truly  national  banks  operating  in 
all  regions  of  the  country.  Some  will  evolve  from  existing  money-center 
banks  or  aggressive  super-regionals.  Others  will  be  formed  out  of  the  merg- 
ers  of  several  existing  organizations,  including  both  major  banks  and  the 
’  top  thrift  institutions.  Of  the  dozen  or  so  national  banks,  five  or  six  will  be 
of  the  size  just  below  that  of  some  of  the  largest  institutions  in  Europe  and 
Japan:  no  institution  will  have  even  as  much  as  5%  of  total  deposits.  There 
will  also  be  a  number  of  regional  institutions  of  a  size  now  commonly 
thought  to  be  that  of  a  money-center  bank.  Several  thousand  smaller  insti- 
tutions  will  survive  serving  very  local  markets,  hut  in  my  judgment,  the 
total  number  of  such  institutions  will  likely  decline  by  half  or  even  three- 
quarters  by  the  end  of  the  decade. 
This  market  structure  will  support  a  number  of  different  strategic 
approaches  to  banking.  Most,  but  not  all,  of  the  truly  national  banks  will 
be  of  the  full-service  variety.  All  things  financial  to  all  people,  much  like  the 
strategic  vision  that  Citicorp  had  been  proclaiming  for  many  years,  will 
characterize  them.  Some  of  the  banks  operating  nationwide  will  be  concen- 
trating  on  retail,  consumers,  and  local  business.  They  will  not  have  the 
22  Public Policy Brief complex  capital  market  and  the  securities  trading  responsibilities  that  are 
normally  associated  with  the  money-center  bank. 
It  is  obvious  that  at  least  two  prominent  money-center  banks,  J.P.  Morgan 
and  Bankers  Trust,  have  little-or  no  interest  in  nationwide  banking  per  se. 
They  are  specialists,  serving  the  wholesale  market  nationally  and  globally. 
That  specialty  is  highly  valued  by  the  stock  market.  They  do  not  need 
nationwide  branches  to  fill  that  niche.  In  fact,  the  share  prices  of  banks  that 
specialize,  whether  in  wholesale  banking,  trust  services,  transaction  process- 
ing,  or  middle-market  lending,  are  consistently  priced  at  substantial  premi- 
ums.  Stock  market  investors  reward  scale  economies  in  banking  but 
severely  punish  scale  diseconomies  that  come  from  overly  complex  organi- 
zations  that  are  difficult  to  manage  and  subject  to  risk. 
The  U.S.  financial  structure  will  see  the  best  of  the  specialist  institutions 
spreading  over  the  country  as  a  whole  but  not  straying  from  the  core  busi- 
ness  that  made  them  exceptionally  profitable.  Thus,  I  can  visualize  some  of 
the  leading  California  thrifts,  which  seem  to  know  how  to  do  retail  banking 
safely  at  a  very  low  unit  cost,  becoming  among  the  top  nationwide  retail 
bankers.  Incidentally,  the  distinction  between  thrifts  and  banks  may  well 
disappear  as  commercial  banks  get  involved  more  heavily  in  home  mort- 
gage  finance.  A  few  of  the  more  prominent  savings  and  loan  associations 
contemplate  switching  to  a  bank  charter  some  day. 
What  about  securities  firms  and  insurance  companies?  While  banks  may 
overcome  intense  opposition  and  end  up  selling  insurance  policies  to  their 
customers,  I  see  no  advantage.in  a  bank  owning  or  running  a  large  insur- 
ance  company.  I  concede  this  is  now  allowed  in  Europe  (and  apparently  it 
is  being  done  successfully),  and  I  also  see  the  eventual  abandonment  of 
Glass-Steagall  barriers  between  commercial  banking  and  investment  bank- 
ing.  As  in  the  case  of  nationwide  banking,  we  are  three-quarters  there 
already.  The  Federal  Reserve  will  continue  to  use  its  discretionary  adminis- 
trative  powers  to  permit  underwriting  powers  to  well-capitalized  banks. 
The  number  of  viable  candidates  will  increase  over  the  decade  as  banks 
come  out  from  under  their  current  asset  quality  problem  and  build  up  their 
capital  ratios.  By  the  end  of  the  199Os,  I  wouldn’t  be  surprised  to  see 
Salomon  Brothers,  to  use  that  firm  as  an  illustration,  being  part  of  a  finan- 
cial  holding  company  that  included  a  major  commercial  bank  operating  on 
a  nationwide  scale.  You  simply  do  not  hear  opposition  anymore  to  such  an 
evolution  even  from  the  Securities  Dealers  Association,  the  industry’s  lob- 
bying  group. 
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As  for  the  regulators,  will  they  be  able  to  keep  pace?  They  always  tend  to 
lag  a  step  behind  market  developments,  and  here  I  have  some  doubts.  It  is 
by  no  means  clear  that  the  political  leadership  in  Washington  is  whole- 
heartedly  behind  tough,  independent  supervision  for  financial  institutions. 
Moreover,  I  do  not  see  any  sense  of  urgency  within  the  existing  regulatory 
bodies,  either  in  Washington  or  in  the  various  states,  to  unify  the  institu- 
tional  structure.  Therefore,  the  kind  of  regulatory  consolidation  that  would 
be  best  equipped  to  oversee  the  coming  transformation  of  our  financial  sys- 
tem  and  produce  the  most  farsighted  international  harmonization  of  super- 
visory  standards  is  unlikely. 
24  Public Policy  Brief - 
-- 
I- 
Alex].  PoIlock 
The  reason  I  entered  banking-and  I  still 
adhere  to  this  belief-is  that  I  think  financial 
systems  and  their  relationship  to  the  rest  of 
life,  including  the  real  economy,  are  philo- 
sophically  fascinating.  In  my  opinion,  there  is 
no  doubt  that  the  fundamental  proposition  of 
my  good  friend  Hy  Minsky  is  righn  financial 
busts  and  crashes  and  crises  are  natural 
occurrences.  However,  we  have  to  be  more 
sophisticated  than  the  usual  ex  post  facto 
explanations,  such  as  that  bankers  are  stupid, 
greedy,  fraudulent-these  are  uninteresting 
hypotheses. 
The  interesting  question  is  how  do  groups  of 
intelligent,  sophisticated  bankers,  investors, 
borrowers,  entrepreneurs,  and  venture  capi- 
talists  find  themselves  caught  together  in  the 
busts?  At  Continental  Illinois  I  lived  through 
a  bank  run.  Continental  Illinois  was  filled 
with  smart,  competent  people-yet  it  failed. 
Walter  Bagehot  observed  that  in  the  excite- 
ment  phase  of  a  financial  expansion,  the 
ablest  and  cleverest  leverage  the  most.  We 
need  to  address  a  subtle  question:  how  is  it 
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that  intelligent,  hard-working,  competent,  analytical  bankers,  investors,  and 
entrepreneurs  end  up  in  financial  messes? 
Often  the  explanation  offered  by  economists  is  one  of  incentives.  If  we  only 
had  better  incentives  (if  banks,  for  example,  had  more  capital,  more  man- 
agement  ownership,  and  more  involvement  by  the  at-risk  shareholders),  it  is 
said,  you  would  not  have  these  crises.  I  am  not  much  impressed  by  this 
argument.  History  is  full  of  private  banks  that  are  not  only  owned  by  the 
bankers  but  where  the  banker  himself.had  his  total  personal  wealth  com- 
mitted  to  the  liabilities  of  the  bank;  those  private  banks  got  involved  in 
financial  bubbles  and  the  subsequent  busting  just  like  banks  and  other 
financial  companies  do  today.  I  do  not  think  the  problem  is  incentives.  I 
believe  the  essential  question  is  one  of  knowledge  and  ignorance,  or  knowl- 
edge  and  error,  or  what  we  may  call  the  doctrine  of  rational  mistakes. 
Don  Schakelford,  Chairman  of  the  United  States  League  of  Savings 
Institutions,  had  this  to  say  about  the  savings  and  loan  collapse:  “The  unin- 
tended  folly  of  the  reasonably  decent  was  far  more  costly  than  the  contrived 
vihainy  of  the  corrupted  few.” 
This  is  a  fine  phrase.  However,  I  prefer  the  language  of  Bagehot  to  the  same 
effect  in  one  of  my  favorite  passages  of  Lombard  Street: 
An  effectual  supervision  by  the  whole  board  of  directors  being 
impossible,  there  is  great  risk  the  business  may  fall  to  the  general 
manager.  A  manager  sometimes  committed  frauds  which  were 
dangerous  and  still  oftener  made  mistakes  that  were  ruinous. 
Error  is  far  more  formidable  than  fraud.  The  mistakes  of  a  san- 
guine  manager  are  far  more  to  be  dreaded  than  the  theft  of  a  dis- 
honest  manager.  The  losses  to  which  an  adventurous  and  plausible 
manager  in  complete  good  faith  will  readily  commit  a  bank  are 
beyond  comparison  greater  than  those  which  a  fraudulent  man- 
ager  would  be  able  to  conceal.  There  is  not  more  unsafe  govern- 
ment  for  a  bank  than  that  of  an  eager  and  active  manager  subject 
only  to  the  supervision  of  a  numerous  board  of  directors. 
I  take  Bagehot  as  a  canonical  source  for  the  key  factor  being  mistakes  and 
errors  of  intelligent  and  ex  ante  credible  actors. 
How  do  managers  come  to  make  such  momentous  mistakes?  One  of  my 
favorite  philosophical  and  managerial  lines  is:  “Many  things  which  were 
considered  impossible  nevertheless  came  to  pass.”  The  question  is  less  why 
they  came  to  pass  than  why  they  were  considered  impossible  by  all  of  these 
well-educated,  hard-working  managers. 
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want  to  say  theoretically),  and  speaking  as  one  who  has  to  make  decisions 
subject  to  uncertainty  and  ignorance  all  the  time,  risk  is  a  feeling.  When 
something  ceases  to  feel  risky,  you  go  ahead.  Very  risky  things  are  done 
because  one  gets  used  to  doing  them.  Feelings  of  riskiness  fade  when  prac- 
tice  changes  only  slowly  over  an  extended  time.  We  are  great  comparers  of 
this  year  with  last  year  or  maybe  even  five  years  ago,  but  as  things  keep 
drifting,  little  by  little,  step  by  step,  over  a  long  period  of  time,  we  get  used 
to  it.  So  we  might  slightly  alter  some  couplets  of  Alexander  Pope.  In  thi 
original,  the  first  word  is  “vice”;  the  bankers’  version  begins  with  “risk”: 
Risk  is  a  creature  of  such  frightful  mien  I  That  to  be  hated  needs 
but  to  be  seen,  I  Yet  seen  too  oft,  familiar  with  her  face,  I  We  first 
endure,  then  pity,  then  embrace. 
The  graphs  that  follow  describe  the  entire  commercial  banking  system  of 
the  United  States  over  a  period  of  four  decades,  from  the  late  1940s  or 
1950  until  1990.”  I  have  taken  the  kinds  of  parameters  that  I,  as  a  general 
manager  subject  only  to  the  supervision  of  a  numerous  board  of  directors, 
care  about  and  have  examined  them  for  the  banking  system  as  a  whole. 
What  they  show  is  higher  and  higher  levels  of  risk  that  happened  little  by 
little. 
We  may  think  of  this  as  “how  to  boil  a  frog.”  You  may  remember  the  old 
story  that  the  way  to  boil  a  frog  is  to  put  him  in  very  comfortable  warm 
water  so  he  relaxes.  Then  you  turn  up  the  heat  one  degree  at  a  time,  and 
before  he  realizes  it,  he  is  cooked.  So  in  the  banking  system,  one  degree  at 
a  time,  little  by  little  as  the  years  went  on,  financial  relationships  shifted, 
but  feelings  of  risk  did  not  keep  up  with  how  much  they  were  shifting. 
What  we  have  is  not  merely  a  decade  of  the  oftendiscussed  “excesses  of  the 
198Os,”  but  a  long-term,  four-decade  buildup  of  financial  fragility. 
The  first  graph  addresses  leverage.  The  leverage  of  banks  is  typically  treated 
as  the  ratio  of  assets  to  capital  or  capital  to  assets.  That  is  a  thoroughly 
misleading  ratio  and  does  not  measure  the  real  leverage  of  a  bank  at  all. 
The  real  leverage  of  a  bank  is  loan  leverage:  loans  to  capital  or  capital  to 
loans.  There  are  many  ways  to  get  into  trouble  iu  a  bank,  but  the  biggest 
and  easiest  and  the  one  most  likely  to  put  you  under  is  through  the  loan 
portfolio.  It  is  a  mathematically  obvious  point  that  the  higher  the  leverage 
of  loans  to  capital,  the  less  margin  for  error  you  have  in  the  loan  portfolio. 
*  1 woukf like  to  thank  Richard  Juko  of  the  Federal  Reserve  l&m&  of  St.  Louis 
for  rewafch  assistance. 
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In  Graph  1,  the  bottom  line  is  the  capital-to-assets  ratio  of  the  American 
banking  system  from  1946  to  1990.  Generally  speaking,  it  is  flat.  The  capi- 
tal-to-assets  ratio  in  1990  was  essentially  the  same  as  it  was  in  1946. 
However,  consider  the  top  line,  the  ratio  of  capital-to-loans.  Capitai-to- 
loans  engaged  in  a  four  decade-long  constant  downward  trend.  Inversely 
stated,  the  loan  leverage,  which  is  the  real  leverage,  engaged  in  a  constant 
four-decade-long  upward  trend  to  historical  highs.  At  the  very  end,  there  is 
a  little  correction,  but  it  has  not  corrected  much. 
Graph  2  represents  the  ratios  of  loans  and  assets  to  capital  and  covers  the 
last  century.  Obviously,  in  this  longer  view,  the  leverage  goes  higher  and 
higher.  The  top  line,  the  assets-to-capital  ratio  of  the  American  banking  sys- 
tem,  rose  dramatically  during  World  War  IL  It  is  now  about  the  same  as  it 
was  in  1946,  but  far  higher  than  it  was  for  the  sixty  years  before  that.  The 
bottom  line  is  loan  leverage,  loans-to-capital.  The  previous  peak  was  in  the 
1920s  at  loan  leverage  of  about  5,  or  $5  of  loans  for  each  dollar  of  capital. 
We  have  gone  far  beyond  that  since. 
In  1955,  we  passed  the  previous  loan  leverage  peak  of  5  to  1.  In  1956,  a 
financial  vice  president  of  New  England  Life  considered  that  the  American 
financial  system  had  gone  through  astonishing  change  since  1950.  He 
argued  that  the  banking  system  was  out  of  capital  and  could  not  further 
expand  its  loans.  That  proved  to  be  a  poor  prediction.  We  have  constantly 
increased  loan  leverage,  reaching  almost  10  to  1  in  1989,  double  the  previ- 
ous  peak. 
The  acceleration  of  asset  leverage  until  1945  represents  financing.World 
War  II.  We  may  recall  that  banks  were  originally  established  to  finance  the 
government  -which  is  what  the  banks  were  doing  in  the  early  1940s. 
Beginning  with  an  asset  leverage  of  7.5,  they  doubled  it  by  1945  in  order  to 
hold  government  securities.  This  seems  to  have  established  a  new  general 
perception  of  what  asset-to-equity  ratio  was  acceptable  and  did  not  feel 
risky.  However,  in  1945,  loan  leverage  (the  real  leverage)  was  only  2.5. 
After  the  war,  banks  did  not  bring  asset  leverage  back  down,  but  over  time 
they  filled  the  expanded  balance  sheets  with  loans  in  place  of  the  previously 
held  government  securities,  and  so  brought  real  leverage  to  its  all-tune  high. 
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Graph  3  starts  in  1913  because  it  displays  the  ratio  of  real  estate  loans  to 
capital  of  national  banks.  Under  the  National  Banking  Act  of  1864,  real 
estate  loans  were  prohibited  to  national  banks.  This  restriction  was  first 
loosened  in  1913:  previously,  the  national  bank  real  estate  loans-to-capital 
ratio  was  zero.  That  did  not  stop  state  banks  from  failing  by  the  hundreds 
in,  for  example,  the  panic  of  1890.  But  because  of  the  nineteenth-century 
experience  with  the  dangers  of  financing  real  estate  speculation,  the 
National  Banking  Act,  which  was  intended  to  drive  the  state  banks  out  of 
business,  prohibited  real  estate  loans  to  the  new  national  banks.  In  1913, 
one  of  the  minor  provisions  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Act  allowed  national 
banks  to  enter  the  real  estate  lending  business,  though  only  for  agricultural 
loans. 
In  the  1927  McFadden  Act,  which  was  in  intent  and  achievement  a  liberal- 
izing  act,  national  banks  were  allowed  to  make  urban  real  estate  loans  of 
up  to  five  years  maturity  and  50%  of  appraised  market  value.  This  liberal- 
ization  added  to  the  real  estate  lending  expansion  of  the  late  1920s.  The 
subsequent  collapse  of  real  estate  finance  was  an  important  part  of  the 
overall  banking  collapse  of  1932. 
Jesse  Jones,  the  head  of  the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation,  recalled 
that  when  he  went  to  Chicago  for  the  1932  Democratic  Convention,  he 
spent  Saturday  morning  walking  around  the  Loop,  where  the  crowds  were 
Public  Pdicy  Brief still  milling,  left  over  from  runs  on  downtown  banks  of  the  week  before.  At 
this  time,  Jones  wrote: 
Scattered  all  over  the  neighborhoods  and  the  suburbs  and  the 
business  centers  of  Chicago  were  the  remains  of  the  banks  which 
had  become  entangled  in  the  financing  of  real  estate  promotions 
and  died  of  exposure  to  optimism. 
But  the  expansion  of  national  bank  real  estate  loans  as  a  multiple  of  capital 
continued  over  the  decades,  accompanied  by  the  progressive  loosening  of 
each  parameter  of  control  in  real  estate  lending  laws,  until  it  got  up  to  a 
multiple  of  4  by  1990.  We  are  all  aware  of  the  magnitude  of  the  problems 
this  entails. 
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Now  we  turn  to  what  bank  managers  think  about  but  hardly  any  academic 
theoreticians  of  banking  ever  address:  the  production  of  banking  services. 
To  produce  our  volume  of  financial  transactions  takes  a  lot  of  people. 
Graph  4  displays  aggregate  banking  employment  since  1948.  When  I  ask 
professional  managers  of  banks  what  they  think  this  line  will  look  like, 
most  get  it  wrong.  Aggregate  commercial  bank  employment  in  the  United 
States  went  up  every  single  year  from  1948  to  1989.  In  fact,  it  quadrupled, 
from  406,000  employees  in  1948  to  1.66  million  employees  at  the  peak  in 
1989.  In  the  198Os,  the  growth  rate  slowed,  but  employment  still  increased 
every  year.  Bank  managers  tend  to  get  this  question  wrong  because  they 
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know  that  in  the  mid-1960s  banks  began  intense  computerization,  which 
has  continued  ever  since.  Computers  notwithstanding,  the  aggregate 
employment  line  continued  steadily  upward. 
We  absorbed  into  the  banking  system  a  tremendous  amount  of  employment 
and  expense,  and  therefore  another  kind  of  risk.  This  is  operating  or  break- 
even  risk.  You  must  pay  for  all  those  salaries  and  benefits,  for  the  expensive 
downtown  space,  and  for  the  computers.  If  you  are  raising  your  break-even 
point  all  the  time,  you  must  push  to  expand  business  volumes  (e.g.  loans)  to 
support  the  expenses.  However,  the  banking  system  was  not  alone  in 
expense  expansion. 
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Graph  5  shows  aggregate  employment  in  the  insurance  industry,  which  also 
quadrupled  during  this  period  and  increased  continually.  Graph  6  is  aggre- 
gate  employment  in  the  securities  industry  over  the  same  forty  years.  The 
securities  firms  do  reduce  employment  in  difftcult  times,  but  the  rising  trend 
line  is  the  same,  with  an  especially  rapid  expansion  in  the  1980s. 
Graph  7  shows  commercial  banking  employment  as  a  percent  of  total 
employment.  Between  1948  and  1982,  the  share  of  total  employment  repre- 
sented  by  banking  doubled.  During  this  period,  the  growth  rate  of  banking 
employment  was  more  than  double  the  growth  rate  of  total  employment  in 
the  country.  Since  the  credit  problems  and  the  expense  control  focus  of  the 
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early  198Os,  there  has  been  a  reduction  in  share  of  employment.  In  1990, 
the  absolute  number  of  bank  employees  went  down  for  the  first  time  since 
1948.  It  will  be  down  again  in  1991  and  one  would  guess  the  correction 
has  a  significant  way  yet  to  go. 
Graph  8  shows  why.  This  graph  displays  the  net  income,  total  assets,  capi- 
tal,  demand  deposits,  salaries  and  benefits,  and  total  operating  expense  of 
the  commercial  banking  system,  along  with  the  U.S.  gross  national  product, 
all  indexed  to  1950  and  corrected  for  inflation.  Measured  in  constant  dol- 
lars  over  forty  years,  banking  assets,  capital,  and  net  income  grew  at  essen- 
tially  the  same  rate  as  GNP,  as  you  would  expect  from  a  mature  business. 
Consider  the  bottom  lime  on  the  graph,  demand  deposits.  When  I  was  a 
trainee  in  the  bank,  on  two  different  occasions  old  bankers  took  me  aside 
and  said  words  to  this  effect:  “Young  man,  remember  that  this  business  is 
about  demand  deposits.”  What  did  demand  deposits  do  over  these  four 
decades?  In  rea1  terms,  they  decreased.  Meantime,  what  did  expenses  do? 
In  constant  dollars,  income,  assets,  capital,  and  GNP  all  multiplied  roughly 
3.5  times  over  the  forty  years;  bank  salaries  and  benefits  multiplied  7.8 
times.  Total  bank  operating  expenses  multiplied  10  times.  That  gives  us  an 
indication  of  how  much  expense  reduction,  productivity  improvement,  con- 
solidation,  and  correction  there  is  yet  to  go. 
Suppose  those  old-fashioned  bankers  were  right  about  demand  deposits 
being  the  key  to  banking.  Graph  9  focuses  on  the  role  demand  deposits 
play  in  the  balance  sheet  of  today’s  commercial  banking  system.  I  particu- 
larly  like  to  discuss  this  issue  with  economists,  who  usually  argue  that 
banks  are  special  because  they  provide  the  principal  part  of  the  money  sup- 
ply  (i.e.  demand  deposits).  But  what  part  of  today’s  American  banking  sys- 
tem  do  these  deposits  represent?  It  used  to  be  the  lion’s  share.  In  1950, 
demand  deposits  were  70%  of  banking  assets.  They  were  more  than  double 
total  loans,  and  were  41%  of  GNP.  Today,  the  demand  deposits  of  the 
American  banking  system  are  a  mere  21%  of  assets,  less  than  half  of  loans 
and  11%  of  GNP. 
Most  banking  managers  do  not  understand  the  financial  statements  of  the 
Federal  Reserve  Banks  or  how  the  Fed  makes  profits.  I  propose  we  think  of 
the  banking  system  as  not  just  the  commercial  banks  but  a  single  system 
with  two  parts:  the  commercial  banks  and  the  Federal  Reserve.  While 
speaking  to  the  Chicago  Bankers  Club  recently,  I  suggested  that  there  is  a 
traditional  line  of  banking  business  which,  had  we  been  meeting  a  century 
ago,  the  members  would  have  considered  normal,  but  which  not  one  of 
them  is  in  today.  That  business  is  issuing  bank  notes,  providing  circulating, 
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hand-to-hand  currency.  Since  the  193Os,  this  business  has  heen  monopo- 
lized  by  the  Federal  Reserve.  Had  we  been  having  this  conference  a  hundred 
years  ago,  all  of  us  would  have  assumed  that  the*  real  defining  characteris- 
tic,  the  special  thing  about  banks,  is  that  they  issue  bank  notes  or  currency 
held  by  the  public.  We  no  longer  make  this  assumption,  and  we  tend  to  for- 
get  that  issuing  currency  is  a  business,  and  a  profitable  one. 
Graph  10 
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If  we  think  of  the  commercial  banking  system  as  having  two  parts,  the 
Federal  Reserve  and  the  commercial  banks,  we  need  to  ask:  which  of  these 
two  parts  makes  more  profit,  the  12,000  commercial  banks  or  the  12 
Federal  Reserve  Banks?  As  shown  on  Graph  10,  the  answer  is  that  in  1990, 
the  12  Federal  Reserve  banks  made  150%  of  the  profit  that  the  12,000 
commercial  banks  did-profits  of  $23  biBion  for  the  Fed  and  about  $1.5 
billion  for  the  banks.  On  average  for  the  decade  of  the  198Os,  the  12 
Federal  Reserve  Banks  made  $2  billion  a  year  more  than  the  12,000  com- 
mercial  banks.  It  takes  more  than  one  thousand  commercial  banks  on  aver- 
age  to  equal  the  profit  of  one  Federal  Reserve  Bank.  This  tells  you  that  the 
currency  issue  is  a  very  attractive  business  that  banks  would  Iiie  to  be  in  if 
only  they  could. 
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Over  four  decades,  the  trends  we  have  addressed-the  long  boiling  of  the 
banking  frog-continued,  and  risk  perceptions  kept  shifting.  Everybody Fundarnentaf  Change  Littie  by  Little:  Banking  Evolution  ~ 
(bank  managers,  shareholders,  depositors,  regulators,  central  bankers,  aca- 
demics,  and  Congress)  kept  getting  used  to  a  system  that  was  growing  ever 
riskier. 
Banking  evolution  brought  us  all-time-high  leverage,  the  huge  cost  of 
relearning  real  estate  lessons,  and  a  deposit  structure  turned  upside  down. 
Banks  changed  from  being  financed  predominantly  by  working  balances  or 
money,  to  predominantly  by  investments  for  a  yield  or  borrowings  of  vari- 
ous  kinds.  Add  to  this  a  major  shift  in  profitability  from  the  commercial 
banks  to  the  Federal  Reserve.  An  excellent  summary  phrase  would  be:  the 
development  of  financial  fragility.  If  we  could  take  a  good  banker  from 
19.50,  put  him  in  a  time  machine  and  let  him  get  out  in  1991,  without  hav- 
ing  gone  through  the  slow  process  of  change,  he  would  be  astonished  at  the 
unrecognizable  banking  system  he  found.  I  imagine  he  would  get  back  in 
the  time  machine  as  fast  as  he  could,  trying  to  get  the  dials  set  back  for 
1950. 
Since  we  are  unable  to  do  that,  what  is  to  be  done  in  the  I99Os?  Of  course, 
there  is  an  abundance  of  competing  ideas  and  proposals.  In  my  opinion,  the 
most  important  first  step  is  to  clarify  our  concepts  of  what  banks  are.  Then 
we  may  have  the  possibility  of  acting  coherently. 
A  key  element  is  to  understand  the  contemporary  role  of  the  government  as 
implicit  investor  in  the  banking  system.  One  way  to  look  at  increasing 
leverage  is  that  the  capital  gets  less  and  less.  Another  is  that  the  capital  is 
there  but  in  two  different  forms.  It  is  partially  explicit  capital  provided  by 
the  shareholders;  the  rest  is  implicit  capital  provided  by  the  government 
guarantee.  To  quote  Bagehot  again,  “In  banking  the  capital  is  used  not  to 
work  the  business  but  to  guarantee  it.”  Conversely,  whatever  guarantees 
the  business  is  the  capital.  If  we  ask  how  much  capital  it  takes  to  capitalize 
the  banking  system  prudently,  and  then  subtract  the  explicit  capital,  the  dif- 
ference  is  the  implicit  capital  provided  by  the  government.  This  leads  to  the 
conclusion  that  the  government  is  implicitly  the  majority  shareholder  of  the 
entire  American  banking  system.  This  implicit  capital  has  promoted  finan- 
cial  over-expansion  and  risk  escalation. 
It  is  easy  to  give  guarantees  because  at  the  time  it  does  not  seem  to  cost  you 
anything.  The  government’s  capital  is  in  effect  stated,  as  opposed  to  paid- 
in,  capital.  It  is  easy  to  commit  to  pay  if  you  do  not  think  you  will  ever 
really  have  to.  The  government  is  a  partner  who  has  committed  capital  but 
has  not  paid  it  in,  and  who  thinks  that  the  capital  is  never  going  to  be 
called. 
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An  older  and  perhaps  more  authoritative  source  than  any  so  far  quoted  is 
the  Book  of  Proverbs.  The  Book  of  Proverbs  suggests  that  a  wise  man  does 
not  stand  as  pledge  for  his  neighbor.  One  wonders  how  much  foresight  the 
author  of  that  old  book  had:  was  he  thinking  about  FSLIC  and  the  FDIC, 
the  Farm  Credit  System,  student  loans,  the  Pension  Benefit  and  Guarantee 
Corporation,  the  FHA,  and  the  Department  of  Housing  and  Urban 
Development  loan  programs?  These  are  our  variations  of  getting  in  trouble 
by  standing  as  pledge  for  your  neighbor.  It  would  certainly  be  preferable 
for  the  financial  system  to  run  without  trying  to  have  everybody  guarantee 
everybody  else.  Bernard  Shull  has  pointed  out  that  banks  used  to  be  a 
unique  source  of  funds  to  the  government;  now  the  government  is  a  unique 
source  of  funds  for  the  banks.  How  do  we  get  out  of  this  tangle? 
Two  more  conceptual  clarifications  are  required.  One  is  that  there  are  no 
such  things  as  “funds,”  and  -funds”  do  not  tiflow”:  there  is  nothing  to 
flow.  Note  that  =liquidity”  represents  the  same  figure  of  speech-some- 
thing  that  flows.  These  are  very  confusing  metaphors.  The  reality  is  various 
sets  of  books  with  assets  and  liabilities,  debits  and  credits.  In  days  of  pre- 
cious  metal  coinage  you  could  meaningfully  talk  about  the  flow  of  coinage. 
But  today,  nothing  flows:  there  are  only  debits  and  credits  on  books,  and 
there  are  liabilities  of  some  entities  that  various  others  are  willing  to  hold  as 
assets-and  then  sometimes  not  willing  to  hold  as  assets.  If  in  the  aggregate 
we  are  unwilling  enough,  new  financing  becomes  impossible  and  that  cre- 
ates  tne  bust. 
The  second  essential  clarification  is  to  understand  that  there  are  two 
entirely  different  parts  of  the  balance  sheets  of  banks.  These  I  call  the 
“Money  Bank”  and  the  “Credit  Bank.”  I  want  to  expand  at  some  length 
on  this  distinction. 
Every  bank  is  functionally  two  banks.  One  of  these  banks  issues  liabilities 
(called  “deposits”)  used  by  the  public  as  money  in  the  operation  of  the  pay- 
ments  system,  a  key  public  good:  this  is  the  “Money  Bank.m  The  Money 
Bank  function  is  the  reason  banks  are  special  and  why  they  are  singled  out 
for  the  enormous  political  and  regulatory  function  they  enjoy  or  suffer.  But 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Money  Bank  has  evolved  from  being  the  primary  func- 
tion  to  representing  only  about  20%  of  banking’s  aggregate  balance  sheet. 
The  other  function  of  the  bank,  representing  80%  of  the  balance  sheet,  is 
the  Credit  Bank.  The  Credit  Bank,  as  it  has  evolved,  is  an  open-ended, 
extremely  leveraged  investment  fund,  which  sells  debt  to  the  public  and 
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invests  in  a  wide  variety  of  assets,  some  very  risky.  Note  that  the  debt  of 
this  fund  (also  called  “deposits”)  is  currently  sold  without  prospectus  or  the 
other  disclosures  otherwise  required  to  purvey  investments  to  the  public. 
Every  bank  thus  has  two  fundamental  parts:  a  Money  Bank,  which  pro- 
vides  (as  old  banking  discussions  called  it)  “circulating  medium”;  and  a 
Credit  Bank,  which  is  an  open-ended,  leveraged  investment  fund.  The 
Money  Bank  is  an  essential  element  of  the  social  infrastructure  of  every 
developed  economy.  The  Credit  Bank  is  just  one  more  way  to  make  invest- 
ments,  among  many  financial  market  alternatives.  These  contrasting  bank 
roles  were  clearly  articulated  by  Milton  Friedman  in  1959,  h-ving  Fisher  in 
1936,  Henry  Simons  in  1934,  and  others  before  and  since. 
The  essential  objective  and  rationale  of  bank  regulation  should  be  to  secure 
for  the  public  good  a  reliable  stock  of  money  in  which  the  exchanges  of  a 
complex  market  economy  can  be  settled.  The  overwhelming  proportion  of 
the  stock  of  money  consists  of  checkable  bank  deposits.  However,  this  pub- 
lic  payment  utility  concerns  only  the  relatively  small  Money  Bank;  the 
much  larger  Credit  Bank  is  an  entirely  different  issue.  In  other  words,  today 
most  money  is  bank  deposits,  but  most  bank  deposits  are  not  money  (they 
are  investments). 
Since  1933,  the  United  States  has  issued  national  guarantees  of  bank 
deposits,  which  have  come  to  represent  (implicitly)  the  majority  of  the  capi- 
tal  of  the  banking  system.  This  public  guarantee  has  not  been  limited  to  the 
stock  of  money,  but  has  promiscuously  covered  the  entire  combination  of 
both  the  Money  Bank  and  the  Credit  Bank.  The  original  confusion  is 
understandable,  since  historically  bank  liabilities  were  predominantly 
demand  deposits  (i.e.  money).  But  over  time,  in  addition  to  guaranteeing 
money,  the  government  has  ended  up  as  co-signer  on  the  obligations  of 
huge,  risky,  highly  leveraged  investment  vehicles-it  is  now  reaping  the 
consequent  staggering  losses. 
During  the  years  of  its  deposit  guarantee,  the  government  has  tried  to  pro- 
tect  itself  by  an  ever-increasing  volume  of  ever  more  complex  regulation, 
requiring  the  matching  growth  of  financial  regulatory  bureaucracies. 
Nothing  is  more  apparent  than  the  fact  that  this  strategy  has  been  an  abject 
failure.  So  what  do  most  commentators,  especially  regulators,  journalists, 
professors,  and  politicians,  suggest  I  More  regulation  and  regulators.  This 
is  an  interesting  example  of  faith:  a  better  conclusion  is  that  the  fundamen- 
tal  design  conclusion  is  unworkable.  A  better  fundamental  design  is  that 
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stable  liabilities  for  the  Money  Banks  and  the  payments  system  can  be 
ensured  simply  by  enforcing  collateral  requirements  to  secure  the  stock  of 
money. 
As  a  real-world,  working  example  of  this  principle,  consider  the  stock  of 
free  credit  balances  in  customers’  accounts  with  securities  brokers.  Every 
securities  broker  is  in  part  a  bank:  free  credit  balances  in  its  customer 
accounts  are  equivalent  to  demand  deposits.  These  balances  are  not  guaran- 
teed  by  the  government.  But  under  the  Securities  and  Exchange 
Commission’s  Customer  Protection  Rule,  segregated  low-risk  assets  must 
be  maintained  against  the  net  customer  balances.  The  assets  are  a  “special 
reserve  account  for  the  exclusive  benefit  of  the  customers,”  as  specified  in 
rule  15~3-3. 
Under  a  collateralized  money  system,  all  money  deposits  would  be  collater- 
alized  under  a  rule  analogous  to  the  SEC’s  15~3-3  or  to  the  National 
Banking  Act’s  security  requirement  for  bank  notes,  requiring  maintenance 
at  all  times  of  assets  with  a  market  value  of  at  least  100%  of  the  money  lia- 
bilities.  Every  bank,  while  remaining  one  operating  organization,  would  be 
understood  and  managed  as  what  it  in  fact  is:  the  dual  functions  of  the 
Money  Bank  and  the  Credit  Bank.  These  two  functions  do  not  need  sepa- 
rate  incorporation  or  separate  organizations  or  complex  holding  company 
structures  or  bureaucratic  agonizing  over  so-called  “firewails.”  They  need  * 
their  money  deposits  collateralized  with  high-quality,  marketable  assets 
(plus  deposits  with  the  Federal  Reserve  and  demand  deposits  due  from 
other  commercial  banks).  This  needs  daily  measurement,  and  like  15~3-3, 
making  management  responsible  for  immediate  self-reporting  of  any  short- 
.  fall.  To  be  honest  with  the  public,  it  would  be  advisable  for  only  the  money 
liabilities  to  be  called  udeposits.” 
The  rest  of  the  bank  should  then  be  free  to  pursue  any  business  its  wholly 
at-risk  creditors  will  finance.  These  other  80%  of  bank  liabilities  should  be 
called  what  they  are,  namely  investments,  notes,  dehentures,  commercial 
paper,  bonds,  participations,  etc.  They  are  not  ~money,  and  they  should  not 
be  riskless.  They  should  not  have  government  guarantees  or  “insurance.” 
The  liabilities  of  the  Credit  Bank  function  need,  like  other  investments 
offered  to  the  public,  appropriate  disclosure  of  their  nature  and  risks,  and 
they  should  be  subject  to  SEC  requirements.  Under  any  system,  given  the 
inherent  tendency  of  credit  markets  to  financial  fragility  and  crisis,  a 
Bagehotian  lender  of  last  resort  to  the  market  is  necessary.  It  is  also  my 
view  than  an  investor  of  last  resort,  like  the’  Reconstruction  Finance 
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Corporation,  is  temporarily  required  from  time  to  time  (say  every  fifty 
years  or  so). 
Collateralized  money  is  a  very  old  banking  idea,  discussed  in  the  last  few 
years  as  “narrow-banking”  but  fifty  years  ago  as  “100%  reserves”  and  one 
hundred  years  before  that  as  an  element  of  “free  banking.”  Most  impor- 
tantly  in  institutional  history,  it  is  the  foundation  idea  of  the  National 
Banking  Act  of  1864-the  original  title  of  which  was  “An  Act  to  Provide  a 
National  Currency  Secured  by  a  Pledge  of  United  States  Bonds.”  Its  con- 
ceptual  history  goes  back  at  least  to  an  essay  by  David  Ricardo  in  1816. 
This  idea  will  undoubtedly  work:  it  is  no  mere  theory.  One  particular  class 
of  bank  deposits,  namely  those  of  municipal  bodies,  is  collateralized  today 
on  a  normal,  ongoing  basis.  The  National  Banking  Act  (and  numerous 
state  banking  laws  going  back  to  the  New  York  State  Act  of  1838  on 
which  it  was  modeled)  created  working  banking  systems  based  on  collater- 
alized  bank  money.  No  holder  of  national  hank  notes  ever  suffered  a  loss. 
This  long-standing  logic  applies  with  equal  validity  to  bank  deposits  used 
as  money. 
A  particularly  apt  historical  case  is  the  Louisiana  Bank  Act  of  1842,  which 
required  short-term,  high  quality  assets  equal  to  the  total  amount  of  notes 
in  circulation  plus  deposits.  It  me,asured  these  matching  assets  and  Iiabili- 
ties  separately  as  what  it  called  the  “movement”  of  banks.  Other,  riskier 
assets  it  gave  the  insidious  name  of  “dead  weight.”  The  result  was  that  the 
banks  of  New  Orleans  not  only  survived  the  nationwide  panic  of  18.56  but, 
according  to  the  financial  historian  Bray  Hammond,  “operated  with  distin- 
guished  success.”  He  comments  that  the  Louisiana  Act  “seems  to  me  in 
substance  the  wisest  adoption  of  practice  to  environment  in  any  banking 
law  I  know.” 
Required  collaterahzation  of  the  bank  liabilities  that  serve  as  money  would 
imply  an  enormous  improvement  in  the  nature  of  the  hanking  system  but 
would  not  require  different  charters,  “breaking  up  banks,”  designing  “fire- 
.walls,”  or  any  other  dubious  bureaucracy. 
It  is  easy  to  predict  that  the  many  parties  who  receive  subsidies  distributed 
to  or  through  the  banking  system  based  on  deposit  insurance,  as  well  as 
those  who  enjoy  the  rents  from  government-organized  financial  cartels, 
will  naturally  oppose  the  collateralized  money  approach.  Those  will  favor 
it  who  desire  to  put  under  the  strictest  control  that  which  should  be  con- 
trolled  (i.e.  money),  and  subject  to  free  competition  that  which  should  have 
market  discipline  of  its  price  and  allocation  (i.e.  credit). 
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I  believe  collateralized  money  is  the  optimal  banking  system  idea,  consider- 
ing  both  history  and  theory.  But  whatever  one  may  think  of  a  specific  pro- 
posal,  the  long-term  development  we  have  examined  of  an  increasingly 
risky  and  more  fragile  banking  system  suggests  that  fundamental  restructur- 
ing  is  required.  We  may  repeat  for  our  own  day  what  Woodrow  Wilson 
wrote  in  1912:  “Waiting  to  be  solved...lurks  the  great  question  of  banking 
reform.” 
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